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Abstract 
In our days, German machine tool makers accuse their Chinese competitors of violating 
patent rights and illegally imitating German technology. A century ago, however, German 
machine tool makers used exactly the same methods to imitate American technology. To 
understand the dynamics of this catching-up process we use patent statistics to analyze firms’ 
activities between 1877 and 1932. We show that German machine tool makers successfully 
deployed imitating and counterfeiting activities in the late 19th century and the 1920s to catch-
up to their American competitors. The German administration supported this strategy by 
stipulating a patent law that discriminated against foreign patent holders and probably also by 
delaying the granting of patents to foreign applicants. Parallel to the growing international 
competitiveness of German firms, however, the willingness to guarantee intellectual property 
rights of foreigners was also increasing because German firms had now to fear retaliatory 
measures in their own export markets when violating foreign property rights within Germany. 
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1 Introduction 
In March 2008, the Association of German Machine Builders (Verband Deutscher 
Maschinen- und Anlagenbauer) complained of the notorious Chinese product piracy: “More 
than half of the German machine builders discover illegal replicas at exhibitions. Three 
quarters of these replicas come from China. Unfortunately, China’s entry into the WTO in 
2001 has not improved the legal protection of intellectual property rights of foreign firms.1 
The resulting loss of German mechanical engineering is about seven billions Euros per year 
(or about 4 percent of total sales).”2 The Association of German Machine Builders did not 
mention that, a century ago, many of its then already existing member firms used the same 
counterfeiting strategies to catch up to their British and American competitors. Already in 
1897, the periodical American Machinist observed: “In going through the shops of a 
prominent German machine-tool builder who has been in the United States and got a good 
many ideas there from, as well bought a good line of the best standard machines from which 
to copy or vary, in the production of its own line, I notice that every solitary American 
machine, whether from Providence, New Haven, or Cincinnati, had had the name chipped off 
and the place painted over.”3 Thirty years later, in 1927, the French periodical La Machine 
Moderne reported: “Information coming from Germany indicates that a number of American 
machine-tools are now being copied by German constructors, some of which are made 
without the slightest alteration. Most of these machines are actually sold as originals, the 
name of the American constructor of the original machine being mentioned in the advertising 
notices, and often even appearing stamped on the machine, with the indication ‘type’ or 
‘model”. We can cite a case where a German firm copied a machine designed and 
constructed by a well-known American manufacturer, and sold in the United States.”4 
 
We claim in this article that imitating and even counterfeiting advanced foreign technology 
and products are typical strategies of firms located in an economically backward country. 
These activities are formally legal when the imitating firms use their new knowledge only in 
those markets where the intellectual property rights of the original inventor are not protected – 
like in Germany before 1877. These activities are clearly illegal when the imitating firms sell 
                                                 
1 „Argumentationshilfe aus dem VDMA zum Stichwort Produktpiraterie”, March 2008. 
2 Press release „Produkt- und Markenpiraterie in der Investitionsgüterindustrie 2008“ of the VDMA, April 2008. 
3 German Machine Copying, American Machinist, February 1897, p. 116. According to Kiesewetter, the lawyers 
of McCormick, an American manufacturer of agricultural machinery, accused the German imitators of being the 
most infamous pirates in 19th century-Europe. See Kiesewetter, H. (1992). Beasts or Beagles? Amerikanische 
Unternehmen in Deutschland. In Pohl, H. (ed.). Der Einfluß ausländischer Unternehmen auf die deutsche 
Wirtschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, p. 170. 
4 Cited after W.H. Rastall, 2. May 1927, NARA, RG 151, 413 (Box 1806). 
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their replicas in markets where the intellectual property rights of the original inventor are 
established – like in the case reported by the French periodical La Machine Moderne. The 
government of a backward country might tolerate or even foster this illegal behavior of the 
firms in its jurisdiction because imitating foreign know-how is one of the most promising 
ways to catch up to the economically and therefore politically leading nations. However, this 
kind of illegal imitation usually only takes place during a transitional period. On the longer 
run, both the firms and the government of the economically advancing country face strong 
incentives to change their behavior from violating to respecting international intellectual 
property rights. 
 
To elaborate this argument, we sub-divide the catching-up process into the three phases 
imitation, (adaptive) innovation and diffusion. During the imitation phase, firms of the 
economically backward country use various imitation channels like reverse engineering, 
attending international exhibitions and foreign firms, analyzing patent specifications, or hiring 
foreign craftsmen and engineers to learn from their superior foreign competitors. This new 
knowledge can be profitably used in their home market because the government of the 
imitating firms does not enforce the intellectual property rights of the foreign firms in its 
jurisdiction.5 In the following phase of innovation, the imitating firms adjust the imitated 
technologies and products to their own technological capabilities and the demand of their 
home market. During this process of adaptation imitation is abating because the formerly 
imitating firms gain step by step the competence to develop their own successful innovations. 
That is why these firms might now lobby for a functioning domestic patent law which does 
not discriminate against foreign firms to make sure that, in return, their own intellectual 
property rights will be guaranteed abroad. 
 
Catching-up, however, is obviously not possible for every country. One of the necessary 
preconditions for both successful imitations and innovations is the availability of a sufficient 
stock and structure of human capital. Aghion supposes that during the imitation phase firms 
rely primarily on workers with secondary education while for innovation workers with tertiary 
education are needed.6 As a result, an economically backward country should concentrate first 
                                                 
5 To avoid misunderstandings, we want to stress that technological transfer is seldom a one-way-street. During 
the catching-up process firms in the technologically leading country might also learn from the activities of their 
foreign imitators. For this “reverse flow” see Jeremy, D. J. (ed.). International Technology Transfer. Europe, 
Japan and the USA, 1700-1914, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
6 See Aghion, P. (2008). Higher Education and Innovation. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 9 (Special 
edition), pp. 28-45.  
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on the improvement of its education system on the primary and secondary levels. Not until 
then when the firms of the advancing country approach the technological frontier the 
improvement of higher education becomes the most important task of education policy. 
Besides human capital formation, other factors like secure property rights, an incorruptible 
administration, openness to competition, or financial institutions capable of mobilizing capital 
for individual firms seem to be also needed for catching-up successfully.7 Germany went 
through these institutional reforms in the second half of the 19th century and thereby supplied 
the domestic firms with the capabilities and resources necessary for imitating and innovating.8 
 
During the diffusion phase, the competence to develop innovations spill-over to more and 
more domestic firms which increases both price and Schumpeterian competition between the 
growing number of efficient and innovative firms in the backward country considerably. 
Sometimes, the former backward firms might even take over the global technological 
leadership and thereby – like the German machine tool makers – change from ruthless 
imitators to campaigners for the worldwide enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
 
Note that the imitation, innovation and diffusion phases often overlap. Especially during the 
innovation phase, first, the (illegal) imitation of foreign technology might cease but not totally 
stop, and, second, the imitation activities between domestic firms might already increase 
speeding up the diffusion of knowledge. We will see in the following that, in the case of the 
catching-up process of the German machine tool industry, innovation and diffusion phases in 
fact took place at the same period of time. 
 
Japanese firms of various sectors went successfully through this whole catching-up process in 
the second half of the twentieth century; the Chinese case mentioned above is obviously a 
contemporary example for the beginning of this transition period from backwardness to 
international competitiveness. We will concentrate on the development of the German 
machine tool industry between 1877 and 1932 which can be understood as a prime model for 
                                                 
7 See Abramovitz, M. (1986). Catching-up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind. Journal of Economic History 
46, pp. 385-406; Buchheim, C. (2006). What Causes Late Development? Insights from History. South African 
Journal of Economic History 21, pp. 52-83. 
8 For a survey of the institutional reforms in 19th century-Germany see, for example, Ogilvie, S. and Overy, R. 
(eds.) (2003). Germany: A New Social and Economic History Volume 3. Since 1800. Oxford: University Press. 
See also Grupp, H., Dominguez-Lacasa, I. and Friedrich-Nishio, M. (2002). Das deutsche Innovationssystem seit 
der Reichsgründung. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag. 
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explaining later catching-up processes.9 Methodologically, we rely primarily on the analysis 
of the patent activities of German and American machine tool makers to answer the following 
questions: 
• How was the chronological sequence of the catching-up process of the German 
machine tool industry between 1877 and 1932? 
• How did the American machine tool makers react against the imitating strategy of the 
German firms? 
• Did the German imitating firms gain an advantage over the non-imitating firms with 
respect to innovativeness? 
 
In section 2, we will discuss the advantages and shortcomings of the patent data used in this 
paper. In section 3, we will describe German machine tool makers’ catching-up process and 
the reaction of their American counterparts in detail. Section 4 will conclude. 
 
2 The patent data 
Our analysis of the patenting activities of the American and German machine tool industries 
is based on different samples of individual machine tool patents, with each single record 
including information about the year when the patent was granted (or applied for), as well as 
the name and location of the firm holding the respective patent. To identify the machine tool 
patents in the total patent population we use the fact that the German patent office, starting 
with the introduction of the German patent law in 1877,10 assigned every patent to a particular 
technological class. Patents covering the technology of the machine tool industry can be 
found in the patent classes 47 (machine parts), 49 (mechanical metal working), and 67 
(grinding and polishing). 
 
Much is said about the shortcomings of patents as a measure for innovation activities. 
Griliches has stated: “Not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patents and the 
inventions that are patented differ greatly in ‘quality’, in the magnitude of inventive output 
associated with them.”11 The first part of this statement refers to the well-known fact that the 
propensity to patent varies across industries. Some industries, like the chemical or 
                                                 
9 For the similar catching-up process in the German chemical industry see Murmann, J. P. (2003). Knowledge 
and Competitive Advantage: The Coevolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions. Cambridge: 
University Press. 
10 See Seckelmann, M. (2006). Industrialisierung, Internationalisierung und Patentrecht im Deutschen Reich, 
1871-1914. Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, pp. 86-106. 
11 Griliches, Z. (1990). Patent statistics as economic indicators: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature 33, p. 
1669. 
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pharmaceutical industries, try to appropriate the returns of their inventions primarily by 
patenting, while others prefer keeping their inventions secret instead. It is often claimed that 
the machine building industry belongs to the later group but we will see in the following that, 
at least in our period of observation, German and American machine tool makers not only 
relied on secrecy but also held a considerable amount of patents. The problem that is 
addressed in the second part of Griliches’ statement is probably the more serious one. Pure 
patent counts allocate the same weight to every patent, no matter whether it has a high or a 
low economic value for the patentee. Using the number of patents as an indicator for 
successful innovation activities therefore leads to a potentially large measurement error. We 
address this problem by analyzing three different types of patent statistics. 
 
Patents applied for are a measure for inventions which were appraised to be new and 
potentially profitable by the applying firms. Patents granted, in contrast, are a measure for 
inventions which were judged to be new by the patent office. Long-lived patents are an 
indicator for innovations which became in fact profitable. This later group was identified by 
Streb et al. using a special feature of the German patent law.12 According to this law, patent 
protection could last up to fifteen years but was not for free. Rather, the patentee had to pay at 
the beginning of each year an increasing renewal fee in order to keep his patent in force. This 
annual renewal fee came to 50 Marks in the first two years, and grew then by 50 Marks each 
year up to 700 Marks at the beginning of the fifteenth year. Consequently, a patent holder had 
to decide annually if he was going to renew his patent for another year or not. The outcome of 
this decision depended on the patentee’s expectations about the future returns and costs of 
holding the patent. The later were determined by the renewal fees and were therefore 
foreseeable with certainty. In contrast, the future returns, which could result either from 
selling the innovation as a temporary monopolist or by licensing another producer to do so, 
were highly uncertain. Streb et al. assumed that the majority of patent holders renewed their 
patents only if the present value of the expected future returns exceeded the present value of 
the future costs. Under this assumption, a long life span of a historical patent undoubtedly 
indicates its comparatively high private economic value. 
 
                                                 
12 See Streb, J., Baten, J. and Yin, S. (2006). Technological and geographical knowledge spillover in the German 
Empire 1877-1918. Economic History Review 59, pp. 347-373. 
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Figure 1 The survival rate of German patentsa 
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a This calculation is based on information on the patent cohorts 1891-1907. See Blatt für Patent-, Muster- 
und Zeichenwesen (1914), p. 84. 
 
A basic question of this life span approach is how many years a patent had to be in force to be 
interpreted as a valuable patent. Figure 1 shows that about seventy percent of all German 
patents granted between 1891 and 1907 were already cancelled after just five years. After the 
fifth year the speed of patent cancellation was decelerating. About 10 percent of all patents 
were still in force after 10 years, 4.7 percent of all patents reached the maximum age of fifteen 
years. 
 
As figure 1 also illustrates, Streb et al. decided to use the cut-off point of 10 years to 
distinguish valuable patents from low-value patents.13 The choice of this cut-off point was not 
arbitrary. Pakes observes that the low renewal fees at the beginning of a patent’s life allow the 
inventor to use the patent as a comparatively cheap option that protects the new knowledge 
and gives him or her the time to learn more about the technological and economic prospects 
of the invention.14 In the view of this fact it would be conceivable to interpret those patents 
that survived this learning process and lived therefore at least about 5 years as the valuable 
                                                 
13 The identification of an individual patent’s life span is generally possible because the German patent office 
published every year the patent numbers of those patents still in force. Since one would have to search for the 
respective patent number in up to fifteen annual lists, the process of making out the individual life span of one 
single patent needs at least about 15 minutes. That is why, given the budget constraint of their project, Streb et 
al. were not able to figure out the exact life span of each of the 800,000 German patents between 1877 and 1932. 
Choosing instead to use the cut-off point of 10 years, they had to search only for those individual patents that 
survived at least 10 years. 
14 See Pakes, A. (1986). Patents as options: some estimates of the value of holding European patent stocks. 
Econometrica, 54, pp. 755-784. 
Valuable 
patents 
Low-value 
patents 
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patents of the patent population. Sullivan, however, came to the result that most of the value 
of the patent stock built up in the second half of the nineteenth century in Britain and Ireland 
was concentrated in the upper ten percent of the long-lived patents. Following this hint Streb 
et al interpret the upper 10 percent of the long-lived patents as the valuable patents of the 
German patent population and therefore selected all patents that survived at least ten years.15 
This selection process resulted in a data base containing 39,343 valuable patents of the 
German Empire (1877-1918) and 27,340 valuable patents of the Weimar Republic (1919-
1932)16 – among those all long-lived machine tool patents which were granted to German and 
foreign machine tool makers. 
 
Figure 2 Three types of patents 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 makes clear that, in general, the patents granted are a sub set of the patents applied 
for, and the valuable patents are a much smaller sub set of the patents granted. The relative 
usefulness of these three patent data sets depends on the particular scientific objective. If a 
scholar is primarily interested in the firms’ invention activities he or she should concentrate 
                                                 
15 See Sullivan, R. J. (1994). Estimates of the value of patent rights in Great Britain and Ireland, 1852-1976. 
Economica, 61, pp. 37-58. See also Schankerman, M. and Pakes A. (1986). Estimates of the value of patent 
rights in European countries during the post-1950 period. The Economic Journal, 96, pp. 1052-1076. 
16 For other empirical studies using this patent data set see Baten, J., Spadavecchia, A., Streb, J. and Yin, S. 
(2007). What made southwest German firms innovative around 1900? Assessing the importance of intra- and 
inter-industry externalities. Oxford Economic Papers 59, pp. i105-i126; Degner, H. (2009). Schumpeterian 
German firms before and after World War I. The innovative few and the non-innovative many. Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte 54, pp. 50-72; Labuske, K. and Streb, J. (2008). Technological creativity and cheap 
labour? Explaining the growing international competitiveness of German mechanical engineering before World 
War I. German Economic Review, 9, pp. 65-86; Streb, J., Wallusch, J. & Yin, S. (2007). Knowledge spill-over 
from new to old industries: The case of German synthetic dyes and textiles 1878-1913. Explorations in 
Economic History, 44, pp. 203-223.  
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on the patents applied for. In cases in which the efficiency of the patent office’s screening 
process is under consideration, a comparison of the patents applied for and the patents granted 
seems to be advisable. If the main objective is to identify those inventions which became 
successful innovations it is useful to look first and foremost at the valuable patents. 
 
It is important to note that these three types of patents not necessarily display a parallel 
development over time. Figure 3 shows, for example, that the machine tool makers of the 
industrial district Chemnitz had a rather constant annual number of valuable patents while 
their number of patents granted was especially high in the 1890s and the 1920s. It would 
therefore be wrong to infer from the rising number of patents granted a similar boom of 
valuable patents and therefore of innovativeness. 
 
Figure 3 Patents granted and valuable patents of the machine tool makers in 
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a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter’s patent data. 
 
In this paper, we match the Baten/Streb patent data base (about 66.700 valuable patents for 
the period 1877-1932) with Richter’s patent data about the patenting activities of American 
and German machine tool makers for four different groups of patent holders which vary in the 
depth of patent information available: 
• 479 German firms which were member of the association of German machine tool 
makers or were identified as machine tool makers in trade journals. Available are their 
valuable patents in the German jurisdiction. 
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• The subgroup of all German machine tool makers of the industrial district of 
Chemnitz, the birthplace of the German machine tool industry. In addition to their 
valuable patents, their patents granted including the application date in the German 
jurisdiction are known. 
• 408 American firms which were member of the Association for Manufacturing 
Technology or its predecessor the National Machine Tool Builders Association or 
were identified as machine tool makers in trade journals. Available are their patents 
granted including the application date and their valuable patents in the German 
jurisdiction. 
• The subgroup of all American machine tool makers of the industrial district of 
Cincinnati which was along with New England and Philadelphia one of the most 
important focal points of the American machine tool industry. In addition to their 
patents granted including the application date and their valuable patents in the German 
jurisdiction, their patents granted including their application date in the American 
jurisdiction are known. 
 
We will use these four patent data sets to analyze the details of German machine tool makers’ 
catching-up process in the following section. 
 
3 The catching-up of the German machine tool makers 
By the Paris world exhibition in 1867, German machine tool makers began with imitating 
American machine tools.17 The most important imitation channel was reverse engineering. 
German firms imported one specimen of a particular machine tool type and used this as a 
model to copy the whole machine tool or at least some of its main components. Trade fairs 
and world exhibitions were the second most important information source.18 German 
engineers examined innovative foreign machinery on the ground and then prepared written 
reports about their findings which could also be used by German machine tool makers who 
had not the funds to travel to the trade fairs and world exhibitions by themselves. International 
trade journals were also used to learn more about foreign innovations. Already in 1897, the 
machine tool maker Schubert & Salzer, for example, employed a translator to scrutinize the 
                                                 
17 For more details about the imitation channels used by the German machine tool makers see Richter, R. 
(forthcoming). Der amerikanische und deutsche Werkzeugmaschinenbau zwischen Konvergenz und Divergenz, 
1870-1933. Bielefeld. 
18 See Moser, P. (2005). How do Patent Laws influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s 
Fairs. American Economic Review 95, p. I214-I236. 
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sixty international trade journals the firm had subscribed to.19 As an additional written 
information source, American patent specifications were circulated among the German 
machine tool makers. 
 
During the intensification of this imitation process the acquirement of personal, often tacit 
knowledge became more and more important. German entrepreneurs traveled to the United 
States to inspect American plants or even to assume a temporary employment there. In a 
publication commemorating the 50th anniversary of the firm J.E. Reinecker, for example, it is 
stressed that this firm owed much of its technological progress to the wide experience the 
entrepreneur’s son gained during his one-year stay in the United States.20 The same firm hired 
in 1897 an American expert for machine tool technology who had once presented the 
innovations of an American firm from Philadelphia at the Chicago world exhibition in 1893.21 
An imitation channel with growing importance were the information about innovative 
machine tools international resellers distributed among the different firms they represented.22 
In December 1903, for example, the French reseller of the Wanderer Works advised this 
German firm to imitate the new features of the Brown & Sharpe and Cincinnati milling 
machines.23 In the late 19th century, no other machine tool dealer network was as dense and 
highly developed as the one built up by the German firms which had establishments in all 
industrial countries with the exception of the UK. 
 
The most successful German imitators used these various imitation channels in combination 
and permanent. Data for the German machine building industry as a whole, presented in 
figure 4, reveal that this catching-up process, which was not limited to the sub group of 
machine tool makers, helped to boost the international competitiveness of the German firms 
in the longer run. In 1885, German machinery exports surpassed imports for the first time. 
After a two-year-lasting collapse of both quantities during the global economic crisis of 
                                                 
19 See Miller, F. J. (1897). American and Other Machinery Abroad. Being a Study of the European Field for the 
Introduction of American Machinery. New York: Press of the American Machinist, p.72. 
20 See J. E. Reinecker Chemnitz 1859-1909, Leipzig: Meisenbach Riffarth, 1909, p. 15. 
21 See Miller, F. J. (1897). American and Other Machinery Abroad. Being a Study of the European Field for the 
Introduction of American Machinery. New York: Press of the American Machinist, p.76. 
22 In contrast to other industries in which sales agencies acted as “information brokers”, machine tool dealers did 
not charge their clients for new information about the innovations of their competitors. Instead, they used this 
kind of knowledge transfer as a mean to improve the competitiveness of their clients’ products. For the role of 
international resellers as „information brokers“ see Streb, J. (2001). Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der 
Schumpeterschen Diversifizierung. Die Entwicklung der Firma Freudenberg & Co. Weinheim vom 
spezialisierten Ledererzeuger zum Kunststoffverarbeiter mit breiter Angebotspalette. Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte 46, pp. 131-159, especially pp. 139-143. 
23 See Staatsarchiv Chemnitz 31030, Rot 201: Letter by Wanderer-Directorate to Winklhofer, 23. December 
1903. 
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1901/1902, machinery exports returned to their upward trend while machinery imports 
stagnated on a low level. Consequently, the export-import ratio more than doubled between 
1900 and 1913. According to Reitschuler (1963, p. 253), in 1913, Germany was the world’s 
largest exporter in the field of mechanical engineering selling abroad machinery being worth 
175.7 million US $ while at the same time the value of machinery export was 162.1 million 
US $ for the United States and 171.7 million US $ for Great Britain.24 
 
Figure 4 Export-Import ratio of German machine buildersa 
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a Labuske, K. and Streb, J. (2008). Technological Creativity and Cheap Labour? Explaining the Growing 
International Competitiveness of German Mechanical Engineering before World War I. German Economic 
Review 9, p. 67. 
 
In the following, we analyze the German machine tool makers’ catching-up process on basis 
of the patent statistics explained in section 2. Figure 5 shows that, measured by the average 
annual number of valuable patents of the 479 German machine tool makers, we can 
distinguish five different phases which match our qualitative and anecdotic evidence of the 
timing of this repeated catching-up process: 
• the first imitation period ((Paris world exhibition 1867)/Introduction of the German 
patent law 1877 to 1899)25 with 2.4 valuable patents per year, 
                                                 
24 See Reitschuler, S. (1963). Die Stellung der Maschinenindustrie im Prozess der Industrialisierung, 
Cologne/Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, p. 253. 
25 Our qualitative evidence suggests that the first imitation period already started in the late 1860. Since the 
German patent law was not introduced until 1877, we are not able to analyze the first decade of this imitation 
period with the help of patent data. Interestingly enough, however, it was apparently the growing imitating 
activities of German firms in the early 1870s which considerably increased the international political pressure on 
Germany to introduce a patent law. See Seckelmann, M. (2006). Industrialisierung, Internationalisierung und 
Patentrecht im Deutschen Reich, 1871-1914. Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, p. 156. 
 12
• the first innovation and diffusion period (1900 to the outbreak of the First World War) 
with 7.3 valuable patents per year, 
• the technological setback during the First World War, 
• the second imitation period (1919 to 1925) with 6 valuable patents per year, and 
• the second innovation and diffusion period (1926 to 1932, which is the last year 
covered by our data) with 31.1 valuable patents per year. 
 
The fact that, during the first imitation period, German machine tool makers acquired only a 
few patents that turned out to be worth to be prolonged for at least ten years suggest that, in 
the late 19th century, the German firms neglected own R&D projects but relied primarily on 
imitating foreign products. Obviously, however, learning-by-imitating created on the longer 
run the competences that were needed to develop successful innovations on one’s own 
account. As a result, the average number of valuable patents per year of the German machine 
tool industry tripled in the first innovation period in comparison to the preceding first 
imitation period. 
 
Figure 5 Valuable patents (VP) of German machine tool makersa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter’s patent data. 
 
The absence of valuable German machine tool patents between 1915 and 1918 in figure 5 
does not indicate the total breakdown of innovativeness in this sector but is due to the fact that 
the German patent office did not publish the name of any patent holder during the First World 
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technological backwardness again in this period because of several reasons. First, the Allied 
trade embargo of Germany disrupted the transatlantic stream of knowledge. Second, German 
firms had neither the incentives nor the resources to invest in new R&D projects because of 
their one-sided engagement in armament production. The German army had ordered the 
German machine tool makers to stop their production of high-quality machine tools and to 
manufacture instead high numbers of low-quality machine tools needed to produce 
ammunition and weapons.26 As a result, the Association of German machine tool makers 
feared already in 1917 that the resulting shrinking of technological know-how would decrease 
their future competitiveness in the export markets.27 Third, the firms’ stock of human capital 
decreased because thousands of experienced machine tool makers died as soldiers. 
Consequently, after the war had ended, the German machine tool makers went back to their 
well-known imitation strategies which they had already brought to perfection in the 19th 
century. Any scruples which the German firms might have had regarding the violation of 
intellectual property rights, had diminished after the confiscation of their U.S. patents by the 
Office of Alien Property during the war. The American commercial attaché in Berlin summed 
up in 1926: “The practice of copying American machinery has therefore extended much more 
widely since the war than it was even before.”28 Due to both their unscrupulousness and their 
wide experience with imitation strategies the German machine tool makers were now able to 
catch-up again in just a half decade. In 1926, the German machine tool industry started to pass 
through its second innovation period with an unprecedented average number of 31.1 valuable 
patents per year. 
 
How did the American machine tool makers react against the imitating strategy of the German 
firms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries? We already know about the various complaints 
about the German imitating activities both during the first and the second imitation period. It 
is reasonable to assume that the American innovators did not only fight with words but tried 
to protect their intellectual property rights by applying for patent protection at the German 
market. We would therefore expect that American patenting activities in Germany were 
especially high during the two imitation periods. 
 
 
                                                 
26 See Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde R 8099/259: Stenographischer Bericht über die Besprechung in den 
Geschäftsräumen des Vereins Deutscher Werkzeugmaschinenfabriken, 5. September 1916, pp. 26-32. 
27 See Verein Deutscher Werkzeugmaschinenfabriken (ed.) (1917): Jahresbericht 1917, p. 3. 
28 NARA, RG 151, 420 (Box 1950): D.P. Miller to Director Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 8. 
November 1928. 
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Figure 6 Patents granted (with application date) of American machine tool makers 
in Germanya 
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a Source: Richter’s patent data. 
 
Figure 7 Valuable patents of German machine tool makers in Germanya 
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a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter’s patent data. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 prove that this expectation is wrong. American firms had a comparatively 
high number of both German patents granted and valuable German patents not during the two 
imitation periods but during the two innovation periods. How can this discrepancy between 
our theoretical expectation and the empirical observation be explained? There are two 
necessary preconditions for patenting activities in a foreign market. First, an innovator will 
only be prepared to apply for patent protection in a foreign market after he has learned how to 
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use this instrument in his home market. Second, an innovator has to expect to sell his products 
in the foreign market at a sales volume that justifies the costs that come along with the 
patenting activities abroad. 
 
Figure 8 Patents granted of the American machine tool makers from Cincinnati in 
the American and German jurisdictionsa 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1877
1880
1883
1886
1889
1892
1895
1898
1901
1904
1907
1910
1913
1916
1919
1922
1925
1928
1931
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
American Patents
German Patents
 
a Source: Richter’s patent data. 
 
Both preconditions were not satisfied during the first imitation period. Figure 8 shows that the 
newly founded American machine tool makers of the industrial district in Cincinnati 
intensified their patenting activities in their home market not before the turn of the century. 
Their inexperience with respect to patenting at home might explain why they also abstained 
from patenting activities in Germany before 1900. However, the increasing number of 
German patents held by American machine tool makers after 1900, proven by figures 6, 7 and 
8, is not only the result of growing experience but is probably also owed to the fact that, in 
this period, Germany has become one of the most important foreign market for American 
machine tool makers who delivered about one quarter of their total exports to German 
customers.29 The increased German demand for their products obviously convinced American 
                                                 
29 See Robertson, R. M. (1966). Changing Production of Metalworking Machinery, 1860-1920. In Brady, D. S. 
(ed.). Output, Employment, and Productivity in the United States after 1800. NBER Books, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 479-496, here p. 493; Penrose, B. and Williams, J. S. (1912): Duties on Metals 
and Manufacturers of Metals. Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., p. 
236. 
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machine tool makers that it has become profitable to get their innovations patented in the 
German jurisdiction.30 
 
Interestingly enough, we found no evidence that three of the most notorious German imitators 
of the first imitation period, namely J. E. Reinecker, Pfauter, and Wanderer Works, 
maintained their imitation strategies during the first innovation period when these three firms 
also held patents in the American jurisdiction. As these German firms now had a strong 
interest that their own patents were respected in their American export market, they abstained 
in return from violating the intellectual property rights of American firms before the First 
World War. Figure 9 proves that German machine tool makers increased their exports 
considerably during both innovation periods.  
 
Figure 9 German Exports and Imports of Machine Tools, 1900-1933a 
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a Statitisches Reichsamt (ed.). Monatliche Nachweise über den auswärtigen Handel Deutschlands. Berlin 
1900-1933. 
 
In the light of the increasing success of German firms in the American market, the German 
government was now also willing to make some concessions to the American patent holders. 
Section 11 of the German patent law of 1891 ruled that a patent could be revoked when the 
patent holder did not manufacture the patented good within the borders of Germany.31 The 
purpose of this stipulation was to avert that a foreign patent holder used his German patent 
only to secure his monopoly in this country but did not employ German labor and did not 
                                                 
30 The average time span the American machine tool makers let pass between the patent application in their 
home market and the one in the German market decreased from 2.3 years before the First World War to 0.9 
years after the First World War.  
31 A similar ruling can be found in section 27 of the British Patents and Design Act of 1907. 
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stimulate German industry. Since the German firms used their American patents in the United 
States exactly in this unwanted way, the German government arranged with the American 
government in 1909 that section 11 of the German patent law was in return not applied to 
American firms.32 
 
However, as we have already seen, the German firms reverted fast to their traditional 
imitation strategies after they had lost their American patents during the war and faced again a 
technological gap between themselves and their American competitors in the early 1920s. The 
Americans were well aware of the revitalized imitating activities of the German firms in the 
1920s. In 1925, the American trade commissioner Theodor Pilger authored a report in which 
he listed 64 American machine tool makers whose products were copied by German firms and 
who were then squeezed out of the German and other export markets by their imitators. Pilger 
suggested as a countermeasure to apply for patents in the German jurisdiction.33 The 
American firms obviously followed this advice. Figure 6 shows that the patent applications of 
American firms in Germany reached a record high in the late 1920s. However, given the fact 
that the German patent office needed in this decade on average about three and a half years to 
grant a patent for which an American machine tool maker had applied for, the number of 
patents granted increased not until 1930. 
 
Figure 10 Time span between the application and the granting of patents of machine 
tool makers from the US and from Chemnitz, 1877-1918, in yearsa 
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a Source: Richter’s patent data. 
                                                 
32 See „Abkommen zwischen dem Deutschen Reiche und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, betreffend den 
gegenseitigen gewerblichen Rechtsschutz vom 23. Februar 1909.“ Blatt für Patent-, Muster- und Zeichenwesen, 
25. August 1909, Nr. 7/8. 
33 See NARA, RG 151, 420 (Box 1950): W.H. Rastall to Julius Klein, 11. January 1926. 
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Figures 10 and 11 illustrate that the German patent office needed actually much more time to 
process the American patent applications in the period after than in the period before the First 
World War. Given the parallel increase in the duration between application and granting dates 
for the patents of the German machine tool makers from Chemnitz after the First World War, 
this fact might be explained by the growing complexity of the new products. 
 
Figure 11 Time span between the application and the granting of patents of machine 
tool makers from the US and from Chemnitz, 1919-1940, in yearsa 
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a Source: Richter’s patent data. 
 
However, since the average time which passed between application and granting was 
considerably lower for the German firms than for the American firms in both periods, with 1.1 
years versus 2.0 years between 1877 and 1918 and 2.3 years versus 3.5 years between 1919 
and 1940, a possible alternative interpretation is that the German patent office deliberately 
delayed the application process of American patents to give the German firms the time they 
needed to complete their catching-up process. In addition, some American machine tool 
makers needed more than ten years to fight their cases through the German patent court 
because several German companies joint in order to prevent American patent applications.34 
The problems, American manufacturers had to face when dealing with the German patent 
office in the 1920s, is illustrated by the experiences of Sol Einstein, design engineer of the 
Cincinnati Milling Machine Company: “It was difficult to get a German patent granted due to 
the opposition from German manufacturers. I therefore was sent to Germany to straighten out 
the difficulties our attorney experienced. When our opponents found out that I was in 
                                                 
34 See Cincinatti Historical Society Library (CHSL), Milacron, Series: Misc. Folders (Schwartz), Box 1, Folder 
Litigation Compilation; Landesarchiv Berlin, Bestand Ludwig Loewe, A. Rep. 250/01/18/Karton 110 u. 130. 
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Germany to attend a hearing before the patent office, from month to month they postponed the 
hearings in the hope I would not stay in Germany. Finally after three months of delaying, the 
hearing was set. With preparation of having a demonstration of an up-to-date centerless 
grinder at the Singer Sewing Machine Plant and three prior art machines [...] set up to the 
experimental room at the patent office, our opponents were willing to withdraw their position 
if we would grant them a license for using all twelve machines they had built. I insisted, 
however, on a ruling by the patent office which finally granted the patent with very broad 
claims.” However, “through the united effort of a large number of German companies, the 
patent, after four years in existence, was declared invalid. In England, our patent was 
declared invalid by a judge who stated frankly that he was particularly interested in 
maintaining the interest of the English people.”35 In Germany, it was the Association of 
German machine tool makers which coordinated the German firms’ fight against the 
American patentees by collecting and encouraging patent appeals.36 
 
We claimed at the beginning of section 3 that the two innovation periods were also periods of 
knowledge diffusion in which the competences to develop and produce innovative machine 
tools spill-over to more and more German firms. To check this assumption we calculated for 
every year t the following Herfindahl-Index H with respect to the valuable patents VP owned 
by firms i=1...n: 
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The smaller the Herfindahl-Index the more equal is the distribution of valuable patents among 
those German machine tool makers firms which actually held valuable patents. The 
Herfindahl-Index comes to one in the case of maximum concentration and to 1/n in the case 
of an equal distribution of valuable patents. We interpret periods in which the Herfindahl-
Index is decreasing as diffusion periods. Figure 12 shows that the Herfindahl-Index is in fact 
decreasing during the two innovation periods (1900-1914, 1926-1932) which implies that an 
increasing number of German machine tool makers were able to develop profitable 
innovations in these periods. Interestingly enough, the Herfindahl-Index first also falls in the 
                                                 
35 CHSL, Milacron, Series: Executives Personal History (Schwartz), Box B-H, Folder Sol Einstein: Einstein, Sol, 
I do remember – men, machines, and the plants behind the Cincinatti Milling Machine Company, August 1972, 
p. 7. 
36 See Staatsarchiv Chemnitz, Bestand Wanderer-Werke, 31030/WW3617: VDW to Wanderer-Werke, 23. 
January 1931. 
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first imitation period which might reflect the general growth of the number of firms in the still 
young machine tool industry. During the intensification of the imitation period at the end of 
the 19th century, however, the Herfindahl-Index increases again. This indicates the 
interruption of the former diffusion process and might be explained by the fact that most of 
the German machine tool makers lacked the resources to engage successfully in the learning-
by-imitating process.37 
 
Figure 12 Herfindahl-Index of the distribution of valuable patents among German 
machine tool makersa 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1877
1879
1881
1883
1885
1887
1889
1891
1893
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
1915
1917
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
 
a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter’s patent data. 
 
To prove this last conclusion we have to show that the German imitators were more 
innovative than the German non-imitators. Fortunately, the Industrial Machinery Division of 
the American Department of Commerce and the National Machine Tool Builders Association 
compiled a list of the 55 most notorious German imitators.38 To answer the question whether 
these imitators were more innovative than the “non-imitating” (or less-imitating) other 
German machine tool makers we calculate the annual number of valuable patents per firm for 
each of these two groups. The results of this calculation are shown in figure 13. The notorious 
imitators were far more innovative than the non-imitating firms, especially in the innovation 
and diffusion periods. We conclude from this finding that the competence to develop 
                                                 
37 William Brown claims “that innovations occurs when the demand for machine tools falls”. See Brown, W. 
(1957). Innovation in the Machine Tool Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 71, pp. 406-425. However, we 
found neither in the German nor in the American case any evidence for this hypothesis. 
38 See NARA, RG 151, 420 (Box 1950): D.P. Miller to Director Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 8. 
November 1926.  
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profitable innovations diffused first and foremost within the group of imitating firms. To 
spend resources for imitation was an excellent strategy to secure long-term growth and 
survival. 
 
Figure 13 Valuable patents per imitating and non-imitating firma 
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a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter’s patent data. 
 
4 Conclusions 
The technologically backward German machine tool makers successfully used imitating and 
counterfeiting activities in the late 19th century and the 1920s to catch-up to their American 
competitors. The German administration supported this strategy by stipulating a patent law 
that discriminated against foreign patent holders and probably also by delaying the granting of 
patents to foreign applicants. Parallel to the growing international competitiveness of German 
firms, however, the willingness to guarantee intellectual property rights of foreigners was also 
increasing because German firms had now to fear retaliatory measures in their export markets 
when violating foreign property rights within Germany. 
 
We interpret this development of the German machine tool industry as a model for other 
historical, contemporaneous and even future catching-up processes. Developing countries 
may learn from this example that the strict compliance to the international rules of law with 
respect to intellectual property rights can slow down the speed of technological and economic 
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progress in their domestic industry.39 Advanced countries may understand, first, that the owed 
their own development similar imitating strategies in the past, and, second, that illegal 
imitation usually only takes place during a transitional period. We predict that the copying 
and counterfeiting activities of the Chinese machine builders which were momentarily 
tolerated by the Chinese government will end as soon as the Chinese firms will be able to sell 
advanced and innovative machinery abroad. 
 
 
                                                 
39 See the similar conclusion in Boldrin, M. and Levine D. K. (2008). Against Intellectual Monopoly. 
Cambridge: University Press, p. 281. 
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